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PART II: MORALITY AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY
1. Morality and the Evolution of Christianity267
Petri Luomanen
1. Introduction
Some evolutionary theorists and cognitive scientists, like Richard Dawkins and Pascal
Boyer, take religion as a spandrel, a by-product of mental modules that originally
supported the evolutionary adaptation of our hunter-gatherer ancestors to some natural
surroundings. These mental structures include modules like agent detector, cheater detector
and various alarm systems that in addition to (or instead of) their original functions work
like “gadgets” (Boyer’s term) that produce religion.268 In its extreme form the by-product
theory sees religion as a harmful virus (or meme), effective in copying itself and spreading
in culture. Its effect on morality is disastrous: it is a major source of conflict and evil.269
On the other hand, there are evolutionary biologists who think that religion is itself
an adaptation. David Sloan Wilson, for instance, argues in contrast to the by-product
theory that religions survive because of their own ability to enhance in-group morality and
267 The article is shortened and modified version of “From Mark and Q to Matthew: An
Experiment in Evolutionary Analysis.” Pages 27–73 in Mark and Matthew II. Edited by E.-
M. Becker and A. Runesson. Wissenschaftlice Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 304.
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013.
268 Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Human Instincts that Fashion Gods, Spirits and
Ancestors (London: Vintage, 2002), 150–54.
269 Cf. Pascal Boyer, The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Religion
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); and Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion
(London: Bantam Press, 2006).
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cohesion. This gives religious groups an adaptive advantage over other groups in
evolution—purely in material terms.270
Throughout the history of the critical study of biblical traditions, scholars have also
presented overall interpretations of the development of Christianity. One of the best known
examples must be Ferdinand Christian Baur’s Hegelian interpretation of the birth of
Christianity as the result of the two opposing theses of strict Jewish Christianity and more
liberal Pauline Christianity, resulting in the synthesis of Catholic Christianity. 271
What have been largely missing are approaches that tie the analysis with the
discussion about the significance of biological evolution for cultural studies or with the
discussion about the coevolution of nature and culture. Now there is growing interest in
this kind of approach, especially in the context of interdisciplinary analyses of the
beginnings of Christianity. Morality plays a central role in the discussion because scholars
who argue for Christianity’s adaptive evolutionary function think that Christianity was
270 David Sloan Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion and the Nature of
Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 44. Daniel Dennett locates his
position somewhere between Wilson and Dawkins, criticizing Wilson’s group selection
model, which, by definition, does not cohere with Dennett’s own “meme’s eye”
perspective. On the other hand, Dennett regards his meme-theorizing as more friendly
towards religion than that of Richard Dawkins. See Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell:
Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 181–88. For an
assessment (and critique) of Dawkins and Dennett, see Armin Geertz, “New Atheistic
Approaches in the Cognitive Science of Religion: On Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell
(2006) and Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (2006),” in Contemporary Theories of
Religion, ed. M. Strausberg (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 242–63.
271 Baur, Ferdinand Christian, “Die Christuspartei in der korinthischen Gemeinde, der
Gegensatz des petrinischen und paulinschen Christentums in der ältesten Kirche, der
Apostel Petrus in Rom,” Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie (1831) 61–206. Reprinted in
Ausgewählte Werke in Einzelausgaben, Vol. 1, ed. Klaus Scholder (Stuttgart: F.
Frommann), 1–146.
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adaptive because of its moral qualities, ability to enhance altruism and care for
dispossessed. Nevertheless—as the following summary of previous analyses shows—
discussion has remained highly abstract, suggesting more than providing critical evidence.
As far as there have been more concrete claims concerning specific social processes that
would explain the evolution of Christianity, these have been presented by scholars from
outside the field of biblical studies. These are important and welcome contributions to
interdisciplinary discussion but they also require more detailed assessment in the light of
available sources.
This article does not attempt to solve the overall problem of the birth of religion or
the question of why religions in general could be adaptive. Instead, I will be focusing on
early Christianity (and partly its predecessor Judaism). Even within this sphere of religious
thinking and practice, my scope is limited because I am developing and testing a model
that would enable us to trace something of a cultural-evolutionary history of early
Christian writings and communities where these writings were produced and used. Thus, I
am taking the early Christian writings to be analyzed in this chapter as literary expressions
of religious ideas and forms of communal life.
In the following, I first introduce and assess some of the key interdisciplinary
evolutionary approaches to early Christianity (Section 2). This leads to the formulation of a
general model for an evolutionary analysis and comparison of early Christian gospels
(Section 3) followed by an example (Section 4) and conclusions (Section 5).
The example deals with the Gospel of Matthew, the Gospel of Mark, and the sayings
gospel Q.272 Because Q has not survived as a full document—but has to be reconstructed
on the basis of Matthew’s, Mark’s and Luke’s gospels—it is possible to regard Q as a
document that was not selected as such in the cultural evolution of early Christianity. The
comparison of Q with the Gospel of Matthew is also highly relevant for the discussion of
the development of Christian morality because Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount was in its
incipient form already in Q. Although often regarded as a crystallization of Jesus’ genuine
272 Q, from the German word Quelle, is generally regarded as a common source for the
Matthew and Luke gospels. It has not survived but it can be reconstructed on the basis of
Matthew and Luke.
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teaching, the Sermon on the Mount as we now have it in the Gospel of Matthew is a
composition that derives from the editor of the Gospel of Matthew. Why did the Sermon
survive in its Matthean form and not in its earlier Q form?
My own interest in this topic is rooted in a larger project which aims at developing
an overall socio-cognitive approach to the spread of early Christianity in which I draw on
the social-scientific criticism of biblical traditions, especially the social identity
approach,273 and the cognitive science of religion.274 These methodological interests also
characterize the evolutionary model to be developed below.
2. Evolutionary accounts of early Christianity
2.1. Background
Many of the recent evolutionary approaches to the birth of Christianity—especially those
falling outside early Christian studies—are characterized by the use of Rodney Stark’s
273 Following Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, “An Introduction to the Social
Identity Theory,” in Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances, ed. D.
Abrams and M. A. Hogg (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), 1–9, I am using the
term social identity approach as an umbrella term that encompasses both social identity
theory, originally developed by Henry Tajfel and John Turner, and the more specific self-
categorization theory developed later by Turner and his colleagues. Both are closely
related social-psychological theories. Their main difference is that social identity theory is
more concerned with group phenomena while self-categorization theory pays more
attention to the cognition of individuals who categorize themselves and their in-groups in
relation to others.
274 For an introduction on how to combine these approaches, see Petri Luomanen, Ilkka
Pyysiänen, and Risto Uro, ed., Explaining Christian Origins and Early Judaism:
Contributions from Cognitive and Social Science, Biblical Interpretation Series 89 (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 2007).
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sociological analysis of the reasons for the rise of Christianity. For instance, David Sloan
Wilson, who is an evolutionary biologist, presents in his Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution,
Religion, and the Nature of Society (2002) an adaptationist program for the study of culture
and religion, including examples from Judaism and early Christianity. Wilson argues for
his program in discussion with Stark, criticizing Stark’s Theory of Religion (1987;
coauthored with William Sims Bainbridge) and hailing Stark’s The Rise of Christianity
(1996). Likewise, W. D. Runciman, a British representative of historical sociology, has
also drawn on Stark in his article “The Diffusion of Christianity in the Third Century AD
as a Case-Study in the Theory of Cultural Selection” (2004). Similarly, Peter Richerson
and Robert Boyd refer to Stark’s analysis when discussing the role of religion in group
selection in their Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution
(2006).275
Presumably, one of the reasons for the use of Stark by these evolutionary theorists is
that Stark’s understanding of the reasons for the rise of Christianity—if viewed from the
viewpoint of evolution—seems to present a clear case of group selection. Stark seeks to
show how Christianity spread through open networks and by improving the quality of life
of those who joined Christian communities. Christian groups survived better in times of
famine and plague and therefore their relative percentage of the population increased.276
An interesting feature in this positive reception of Stark among evolutionary theorists
is that the frameworks from which the evolutionary theorists view Stark’s research data
275 Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge, A Theory of Religion, Toronto Studies in
Religion 2 (New York: P. Lang, 1987); Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity: A
Sociologist Reconsiders History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Peter J.
Richerson and Robert Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human
Evolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 162–63, 210–11, 273 n. 29
(Richerson and Boyd also refer to David Sloan Wilson); Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral:
Evolution, Religion and the Nature of Society; W. G. Runciman, “The Diffusion of
Christianity in the Third Century AD as a Case-Study in the Theory of Cultural Selection,”
European Journal of Sociology 45(1) (2004): 3–21.
276 See, for instance, Stark, The Rise of Christianity, 73–94, 95–120, 147–62.
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differs quite clearly from Stark’s own perspective. Stark himself is a supporter of
Intelligent Design.277 He thinks it is possible to apply the evolutionary viewpoint of
variation and selection of the fittest in the study of cultural “evolution” but that happens
only “within the ‘species’ known as human cultures or, … within the ‘species’ called
religion.”278 It is clear that this kind of evolutionary analysis is quite restricted as compared
with Darwinian evolutionary analysis which allows reasoning across species. Nevertheless,
these discrepancies notwithstanding, I agree with the aforementioned evolutionary theorists
277 Rodney Stark, Discovering God: The Origins of the Great Religions and the Evolution
of Belief (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 395–99. In his most recent publications Stark
has clearly lost touch with appropriate academic discussion. He often ridicules his
opponents energetically instead of focusing on presenting proper arguments. One example
of this is the way he treats Boyer, Dawkins and Dennett in Stark, Discovering God, 40–42.
278 Ibid., 8–9. In the present context, it is not possible to go into the details of Stark’s
understanding of religion, nature and science. In short, the cornerstones of his view seem
to be: (1) The world was created by Intelligent Designer (ibid., 395–99). Thus (2) both
nature and human social life are governed by natural and social laws (Stark, The Rise of
Christianity, 23, 26; Stark, Discovering God, 398–99). (3) Revelation is guided by divine
accommodation, which means that humans, according to their growing capacities of
understanding, get more information about and from God (ibid., 5–8). (4) Religions are
doctrinally driven (although people do not join religious movements on the basis of
doctrine but through their social networks); doctrines create the forms of life, and great
leaps in the development are instigated by religious geniuses who invent the new ideas
(alternatively, “God reveals them”; ibid., 43–46). Therefore, (5) theology involves formal
reasoning about God, and science is also theology (ibid., 5, 399). This is also (6) the reason
for the rise of science and western success; it was made possible by Jewish-Christian
understanding of the one and the reasonable Intelligent Designer (Rodney Stark, The
Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success
(New York: Random House, 2005). Consequently, (7) rational choice / exchange theory is
well suited for analyzing culture and religion.
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that it is possible to apply Stark’s research data in a broader Darwinian cultural analysis of
the evolution of early Christianity.
In another context, I have assessed Rodney Stark’s sociology of early Christianity in
detail,279 showing the weak points of his approach, which relies too heavily on social laws
and is therefore susceptible to anachronisms. Space does not allow a repetition of the
discussion here, but I agree with Stark that open networks were necessary for the spread of
Christianity and I have adopted that viewpoint as a part of the model applied in this article.
W. D. Runciman’s analysis of Christianity in the framework of cultural evolution draws
largely on Stark but makes some important qualifications, especially concerning strategies
towards insiders and outsiders, which I take into account in the model (see below).
In the following, I introduce and assess two different evolutionary approaches as a
background for the model of this article, one by David Sloan Wilson, and the other by
Gerd Theissen. Wilson and other contemporary evolutionary theorists of religion seem to
be totally unaware of Theissen’s contribution although it was published already in 1984.
The discussion of these two approaches, coming from two different branches of
scholarship, sets the larger framework for the model that this article applies to the gospels
of Mark and Matthew and their common source Q.
2.2. David Sloan Wilson’s Darwin’s Cathedral
As noted above, Wilson differs from evolutionary theorists and cognitive scientists like
Richard Dawkins and Pascal Boyer, who take religion as a by-product, by arguing that
religions survive because of their ability to enhance in-group morality and cohesion.
279 Petri Luomanen, “Rodney Starks tatsächliche Sozialwissenschaft (Real Social Science)
im Lichte des sozial-mechanischen Zugangs (social mechanism approach),” in Alte Texte
in neuen Kontexten: Wo steht die sozialwissenschaftliche Biblelexegese?, ed., R. E.
DeMaris and W. Stegemann (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2015), 265–284.
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Since Wilson pictures groups as organisms that are adapted to their surroundings, he
realizes that his application of evolutionary biology to social sciences “amounts to a
revival of functionalism in social sciences.”280
The new methodological impact that Wilson claims to offer to social sciences can be
summarized in three points: First, social sciences should learn from evolutionary biology
the art of making distinctions between ultimate and proximate explanations. In Wilson’s
approach, ultimate explanations refer to the survival and reproduction of the species. Since,
from the viewpoint of biological evolution, history is ultimately steered by survival and
reproduction, these are the most profound explanations. Wilson calls this the prediction
arm of the adaptationist program.281 Proximate explanations refer to the mechanisms that
actually cause the behavior. Wilson calls these the production arm of the adaptationist
program. Wilson emphasizes at several points that it is important to keep the ultimate and
280 Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 48. Thus, Wilson has a double mission among social
scientists. On the one hand, he seeks to show how his adaptationist evolutionary program
would revolutionize the study of religion in social sciences. On the other hand, in order to
convince his readers in the social sciences he also needs to prove that the bad reputation of
functionalism within the social sciences is not totally justified and that functionalism, at
least in the form that he applies it, is theoretically solid and empirically verifiable.
Furthermore, group selection is the topic for which Wilson has argued among evolutionary
biologists. Although he may have convinced some of his colleagues that group selection is
something one has to take into account in addition to individual selection, many think that
the effects of group level selection are relatively limited. Cf. Pascal Boyer, “Religion,
Evolution, and Cognition,” Current Anthropology 45(3) (2004): 431–32; Samir Okasha,
“Could Religion Be a Group-Level Adaptation of Homo sapiens?,” in Studies in History
and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
Biomedical Sciences 34(4) (2003): 700–1, 703–4; Michael Ruse, “Can Selection Explain
the Presbyterians?” Science 297(5586) (2002): 1479.
281 Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 172–73.
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proximate explanations apart. This is because reproduction and survival are the only hard
facts that can be observed and of which we can say something with relative certainty. 282
Second, it is important to focus on the appropriate level of analysis. Group selection
can become visible only by focusing on the right adaptive unit.283 Third, Wilson thinks that
evolutionary biology can offer a more sophisticated theory of psychology for the social
sciences. In this regard, Wilson follows Cosmides and Tooby’s research program.284
Do these points offer useful insights? Starting from the last claim, I agree here with
Justin Barrett who finds the relation of the cognitive science of religion and evolutionary
psychology more “opportunistic than necessary.” Evolutionary psychology may sometimes
contribute to the depth of cognitive explanations but it is not the most essential element.285
In the sphere of cultural evolution, this means that what matters are the cognitive
properties of the mind—which were the same in the first century CE as they are now—that
affect the transmission of cultural representations. It is of secondary importance how these
properties have evolved.
As regards the second point, it is easy to agree with Wilson’s demand to focus on the
correct unit in order to see its adaptive functionality. However, from the perspective of
early Christian studies, it must be noted that the idea of focusing on smaller adaptive units
is not unknown in the study of early Christianity. Wilson also seems to have realized this
282 Ibid., 68, 84, 172–77, 188.
283 Ibid., 177–82, 188.
284 Ibid., 84–85. Cf. Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, “Beyond Intuition and Instinct
Blindness: Toward an Evolutionarily Rigorous Cognitive Science,” Cognition 50(1-3)
(1994): 41–77; Tooby and Cosmides, “Evolutionizing the Cognitive Sciences: A Reply to
Shapiro and Epstein,” Mind & Language 13(2): 195; idem., “Evolutionary Psychology,
Ecological Rationality, and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences.” Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 30 (01) (2007): 42–43.
285 See Justin L. Barrett, “Cognitive Science of Religion: What Is It and Why Is It?”
Religion Compass 1(6) (2007): 779.
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after having read Elaine Pagels’ The Origin of Satan (1995).286 However, what strikes
Wilson as “evolutionary” in Pagels’ book are observations and assumptions that are quite
familiar to many scholars of early Christianity: different gospels and re-editions of gospels
were produced for the needs of local communities. For Wilson, these are “adaptive
responses to local pressures” that betray underlying evolutionary processes.287
It is no surprise that Wilson, who derives his inspiration from classics of sociology
like Durkheim, sees something familiar here. Questions about the social setting of smaller
units of gospel traditions were introduced into biblical studies through the form-critical
method at the beginning of the 20th century. Form criticism, for its part, was partly inspired
by the rise of the social sciences. Redaction criticism transposed the questions about the
social setting of oral traditions to the level of entire gospels. Thus, in some sense, questions
286 Elaine Pagels, The Origin of Satan (London: Penguin Books, 1995).
287 See Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 213, 215, 218. As a matter of fact, Stanley Stowers
has recently challenged the largely accepted assumption about gospels as products of local
communities. See, Stanley Stowers, “The Concept of ‘Community’ and the History of
Early Christianity,” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 23 (3–4) (2011): 238–56.
For Mark, see also Oda Wischmeyer, “Forming Identity Through Literature,” in Mark and
Matthew I. Comparative Readings: Understanding the Earliest Gospels in their First-
Century Settings, ed. E.-M. Becker and A. Runesson, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen
zum Neuen Testament, 271 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). In contrast to Richard
Bauckham’s less convincing “Gospels for all nations” paradigm—which also challenges
the classic notion about gospels as products for local communities—Stowers calls forth
more accurate and perceptive analysis of the scribal culture and the variety of social
formations that contributed to the spread of Christianity. Stowers regards the idea about a
local community that is unified in belief and practice as a later Christian myth of origins
that is based on the uncritical adoption of the picture propagated by Paul and Eusebius.
Stowers’ point is well taken and his article clearly shows the need to revise much of the
discussion about how texts and authors relate to assumed communities. Cf. Richard
Bauckham, ed., The Gospels For All Christians: Rethinking the Gospel Audiences (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998).
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connected to adaptationism have been on the agenda of biblical scholars for quite a long
time.
As regards the first point—making a distinction between ultimate and proximate
explanations—it is clear that the social-scientific study of the Bible and related literature
and culture would surely benefit from a more profound understanding of the character of
explanations that are applied within the discipline. Another question is how far the
distinction between ultimate and proximate explanations can take us. The terms used in
this distinction belong to the standard vocabulary of evolutionary biologists. However,
there is no generally accepted definition for their content. Therefore, the use of these terms
has often created considerable confusion within evolutionary biology and in discussions
concerning cultural evolution. Instead of ultimate and proximate explanations, one should
rather refer to evolutionary and non-evolutionary explanations. 288
Despite these observations, it is clear that Wilson’s book has its merits. As a matter
of fact, Wilson’s insistence on mechanisms comes close to the so-called “social mechanism
approach” that emphasizes the role of middle-range theorizing and the need to explicate
the causal mechanisms that are effective in social processes. However, in contrast to
Wilson, this approach does not take the microlevel causal processes as less important than
the evolutionary “ultimate” processes.289
Wilson’s book also includes a very interesting section on altruism that is important
for the present topic. Wilson argues that restricted altruism is an evolutionary adaptation
288 Petri Ylikoski and Tomi Kokkonen, Evoluutio ja ihmisluonto (Helsinki: Gaudeamus,
2009), 329–38.
289 Peter Hedström, Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg,
“Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay,” in Social Mechanisms: An Analytical
Approach to Social Theory, ed. P. Hedström and R. Swedberg, Studies in Rationality and
Social Change, vol 11 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1–26. Peter
Hedström and Lars Udehn. “Analytical Sociology and the Theories of Middle Range,” in
The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology, ed. P. Hedström and P. Bearman (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2009), 25–47.
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that can be found “throughout the animal kingdom, at least in a rudimentary form.”290
However, although Wilson is, as a biologist, able to provide some interesting parallel
examples from the life of guppies, the main thrust of the argument is derived from game
theories developed by political scientists. Wilson bases his argument on the so-called “Tit-
For-Tat-rule” (TFT-rule) that was presented by Anatoly Rapaport in a computer simulation
tournament where the idea was to develop rules for altruistic and selfish behavior.
Rapaport’s simple rule, according to which TFT remains altruistic with altruistic partners
but turns selfish toward selfish partners, won the game even when the TFTs were
destroyed in the selfish mode. Despite this, altruistic pairs take over the population in the
long run. There are interesting variations of the simple TFT rule, and it is clear that this
sort of theorizing may help us understand, for instance, the prevalence of both forgiveness
and retaliation in biblical tradition.291
Overall, although evolutionary biologists may still have to discuss the role of group
selection in natural evolution at large, it seems clear to me that the idea of group selection
in the area of evolution of the human species and cultural evolution is grounded well
enough to provide a meaningful starting point for evolutionary accounts of culture and
religion. Thus, I agree with Wilson about the significance of group selection in the research
on the evolution of the human species and culture although I think that a more convincing
and culture-sensitive case can be made on the basis of coevolution of nature and culture
than by trying to show the significance of group selection in social sciences directly from
biological evolution, as Wilson prefers to do.
2.3. Gerd Theissen’s Biblical Faith
290 Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 189–94, esp. 194.
291 For an introduction to game theories in the study of religion, see William Sims
Bainbridge, God from the Machine: Artificial Intelligence Models of Religious Cognition
(Lanham: Altamira Press, 2006).
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Gerd Theissen’s Biblical Faith: An Evolutionary Approach was published already in 1984
but it has remained relatively unknown even among scholars of early Christianity. 292
Despite its main title, Biblical Faith, which does not give a first impression of a liberal,
science-oriented approach, the book is an ambitious attempt to explain and interpret
biblical history and faith in the framework of Darwinian evolution.
Theissen’s book has four main parts. In Part One, Theissen outlines the theory of
evolution to be applied in the book, discussing the relation of scientific thought to faith as
well as the relation of biological evolution to cultural evolution. The following parts deal
with the three main articles of faith: Part Two analyzes faith in the one and only God, Part
Three faith in Jesus of Nazareth and Part Four faith in the Holy Spirit.
Contradictions relativized
Part One begins with stating three fundamental contradictions between science and faith:
(1) Hypothetical scientific thought versus apodictic faith. While science creates hypotheses
to be tested and confuted, faith claims the value of absolute truth for its statements. (2)
Scientific thought is subject to falsification; faith goes against the facts. (3) Scientific
thought delights in dissention; faith is based on consensus.293 In Theissen’s view, these
contradictions are only apparent and they can be relativized in the light of evolutionary
theory.
292 The book develops further ideas that Theissen already presented in his Inaugural
Lecture at the University of Heidelberg, October 29, 1980. Reprinted in Gerd Theissen,
“Neutestamentliche Christologie und modernes Bewusstsein,” in Neutestamentliche
Grenzgänge, ed. P. Lampe and H. Schwier, Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus /
Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments 75 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
2010).
293 Gerd Theissen, Biblical Faith: An Evolutionary Approach (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007
[1984]), 3–8.
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First, hypothetical scientific thought and faith are not contradictory since both are
ways of coping with an unknown reality. This point relies on the important epistemological
premise of Theissen’s approach: evolutionary epistemology:
Evolutionary epistemology regards the hypothesis of human knowledge as a
continuation of that comprehensive process of adaptation of life to reality
which governs all organic structures. Knowledge is the adaptation of
cognitive structures to reality, the accommodation of thought to experience.
Conversely: life forms knowledge.294
Second, science which is controlled with falsification, and faith which goes against the
facts, are not contradictory in the last analysis because both are ways of coping with the
pressure of selection. In Theissen’s view, they “both accept the pressure of selection from
reality and despite its harshness see it as a productive force.” Science subjects its
hypotheses to reality in order to better comply with it. It “affirms the falsification of its
hypotheses.” Faith goes against the facts in the sense that it “hopes in suffering, in crisis, in
collapse, even against appearances. It is unconditional motivation to live.” 295 Theissen
understands “going against the facts” in a restricted sense. It does not mean nonsensical
opposition to the facts revealed by science but an attitude that looks beyond the harsh facts
294 Theissen, Biblical Faith, 19. Evolutionary epistemology forms the core of Theissen’s
approach. One of the theses Theissen develops on the basis of this epistemology concerns
the possibility of experiencing resonance:
Evolution has made possible partially successful structures of adaptation which are
given with life and which enable us to have experiences of resonance – experiences
of harmony between subject and reality – in which we detect in reality something
that corresponds to us.
 “Existential experience of resonance” is important in Theissen’s evolutionary thinking. It
is experienced in a variety of areas of life: in nature, art, music, in interaction with other
human beings.
295 Ibid., 26–30.
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and is motivated to live even if all the facts speak against the chances of survival. As we
will see later, the idea of struggling against the forces of natural selection becomes crucial
in Theissen’s overall interpretation.
Third, the apparent contradiction between the science that delights in dissent and
faith that depends on consensus is, in the last analysis, a matter of speed of change.
Science and faith are both open to mutations but both are also conservative—like nature
itself. Natural evolution allows only an infinitesimal number of mutations, many of which
do not survive, in order to sustain the adaptations that have already proved their
functionality. Different areas of science progress at different speeds, and religion makes
progress more slowly than science. Nevertheless, religion makes progress. In Theissen’s
view, “No one can rule out the possibility that there will be new revelatory figures in the
future.” 296
Biological and cultural evolution
When discussing the relation of biological and cultural evolution, Theissen deals with the
standard three main areas of evolutionary theory: variability, selection and preservation.
Theissen’s understanding of the relationship between biological and cultural evolution is
largely compatible with the theory of coevolution of nature and culture as it is presented by
Richerson and Boyd. 297 Possibly this is because both are drawing on D. T. Campbell’s
ideas about the relation of cultural and biological evolution.298 In the present context, I will
not go into the details of that discussion but will take up one point that is crucial for
Theissen’s understanding of the function of religion in evolution and, consequently, for his
interpretation of the development of biblical religion. In Theissen’s view,
296 Ibid., 30–41, esp. 35.
297 Richerson and Boyd, Not by Genes Alone.
298 Theissen, Biblical Faith, 9, 177 n. 7; Richerson and Boyd, Not by Genes Alone, 16–17.
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Culture begins where human beings reduce the pressure of selection by
intelligent behaviour, i.e. it also makes human life possible where it would
have no chance of survival without its deliberate intervention. Culture is
diminution of selection through change and differentiation in behaviour. At
the same time, it creates new forms of pressure of selection: “hard” selection
is replaced by “soft” selection.299
Furthermore,
The thesis of this book is that if culture generally is a process which reduces
selection, religion is the heart of human culture. It is a rebellion against the
principle of selection. It makes human beings open to a greater reality before
which each individual has infinite value and is absolutely equal. Experiences
with this reality are gathered together in exemplary form in the Bible.300
The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit
Theissen’s central idea about culture and religion being forces that work against and
soften, though not totally invalidate, the pressures of hard natural selection become clear in
his description the birth of biblical monotheism. It is a standard view that during the
Babylonian exile (586 BCE) and afterwards, when people were allowed to return to their
homeland, Israel moved from the idea of worshipping only one god, namely its own god
Yahweh, to the idea of there existing only one god. The crucial evolutionary twist lies in
the fact that while the natural conclusion after being defeated should have been that
Yahweh was weaker than the gods of the Babylonians, faith claimed that this is not the
299 Theissen, Biblical Faith, 13.
300 Ibid., 49. My emphasis.
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case: Yahweh is the one and only God. The problem was with the nation that had not been
faithful to his covenant and commands.301
In Jesus’ case, the twist is in his radical questioning of the “second principle of
election, the power of selection.” Jesus’ proclamation and life—followed by the evolution
of Christian faith—granted unconditional value to forms of life that would become extinct
under the raw forces of natural selection: to the sick, the weak, the meek, strangers and
slaves. This does not concern only natural selection but also the pressure of cultural
selection: Jesus breaks the usual boundaries set up by family, other people, and the state.302
The force through which people can become incorporated into this ongoing struggle
against the harshness of biological and cultural selection is the Spirit:
The Spirit aims at an inner transformation of humanity. Those seized by it are
incorporated into the history of the protest against selection from the
beginnings of Israel to Jesus of Nazareth; indeed, this history becomes their
own history, and its struggles become their struggles.303
Theissen sees in the Pauline juxtaposition of “flesh” and “Spirit” the conflict of two phases
of evolution: biological evolution and cultural evolution. In this conflict, the Spirit is on the
side of cultural evolution although the Spirit is also always ready to fight against the
oppressive laws of culture.
But a series of arguments suggests that the truth could be what liberal
theologians love to deny, that we have a “natural” inclination to sin, in other
words that we have pre-programmed tendencies of behaviour which are held
in check by strong cultural control in the opposite direction and that when the
301 Ibid., 51–81, esp. 67–72.
302 Ibid., 114–15.
303 Ibid., 140.
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cultural systems of restraints collapse they unleash a terrifying “proneness to
degeneration among human beings.”304
Assessing Theissen’s evolutionary approach
When compared with Wilson’s approach, it is clear that Theissen’s evolutionary exposition
is much more sophisticated in terms of the knowledge of the sources and in the application
of the social science approach to early Christianity. However, although interesting,
theoretically well-grounded, and appealing as an overall interpretation, Theissen’s work is
highly abstract and leaves open many concrete questions of how adaptation and selection
happened on the grassroots level. How were different Christian communities able to gain
selective advance by softening the hard natural selection and in competition with other
contemporary cultural and religious forms of life? How are the large scale processes and
quite abstract principles of faith that in Theissen’s view characterize early Christianity as a
whole related to concrete documents and their contribution to the development of early
Christianity? Wilson’s question about the level of analysis and about the units that were
selected in practice, is crucial here.
Theissen’s interpretation of Jesus’ message and role in challenging the natural
selection process also raises the question about the so-called “free riders,” people who
might take advantage of uncompromised altruism, causing net costs to Christian
communities by using their resources without any return and thus making early Christians
more susceptible to the hard forces of natural selection. As noted above, game theory
suggests that altruism can be successful only in a restricted form because restricted
altruism has better chances of survival than unconditional altruism. Theissen touches on
this problem when he deals with ecclesiology and solidarity within Christian churches,305
but the discussion is not explicitly connected to evolutionary discussion about altruism and
group selection.
304 Ibid., 146–7.
305 Ibid., 158–63.
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3. Towards a model for the evolutionary analysis of early Christian gospels
3.1. Open networks and identity markers
One of the previously neglected topics that Stark has brought into focus is the question
about the type of networks through which Christianity was able to spread. In Stark’s view,
it was essential for Christianity that it remained an open network which was able to reach
out to new members and integrate them.306
I fully agree that without open networks Christianity would not have spread the way
it did. However, I also think that W. D. Runciman has a point when he emphasizes that the
success of Christianity in cultural evolution was based on the combination of unconditional
benevolence towards outsiders (which Stark sees as a sign of the openness of Christian
networks) and strong reciprocity within the community. Open networks are necessary for
effective spreading of a movement but they are not enough to hold local communities
together. A movement that spreads through open networks would soon fall apart unless it
is able to form stable, more closely knit local communities. Runciman’s main point is that
unconditional altruism needs to be balanced with reciprocity if the movement wishes to
avoid being exploited by free riders. As was noted above, this is a question that Theissen’s
analysis leaves open. Therefore, I think that an analysis of the evolution of religious
movements also needs to pay attention to community control mechanisms through which
the movement is able to defend itself against exploitation.
Another important factor that supports the survival of religious movements is identity
construction and maintenance. István Czachesz, for instance, has singled out symbolic
identity markers as one of the factors that affected the spread of Christianity.307 However,
306 Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity, 73–94, 95–128.
307 István Czachesz, “Theologische Innovation und Sozialstruktur im Urchristentum: Eine
kognitive Analyse seiner Ausbreitungsdynamik,” Evangelische Theologie 71(4) (2011):
259–72. Czachesz suggests a model for the analysis of the spread of religious movements
157
Czachesz’s symbolic identity markers address the question of identity maintenance only on
a very general level. Czachesz takes his cue from Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd who
argue that early hunter-gatherers actually formed larger clans earlier than has been
previously assumed (around 100,000 year ago, at the latest, instead of the beginning of
agriculture ca. 11,500 ago) and this happened with the help of symbols which the clans
used as their identity markers.308
I agree that this is an important factor and absolutely essential to take into account.
However, it seems that symbolic identity markers as they are defined by Czachesz are
more important on a “clan” level where they may provide the main means of identity
recognition, while on the local level other social-psychological factors also play their
role.309 In the perspective of the social identity approach, these local factors can be
analyzed with the help of such concepts as exemplars of group members, cultural and
cognitive prototypes and outgroup stereotypes.310They provide important means of identity
construction and recognition in everyday life.
that distinguishes three factors: (1) memorability of religious representations, (2) the
structure of social networks and (3) symbolic identity markers. For a more detailed
discussion of Czachesz’s model, see Petri Luomanen, “From Mark and Q to Matthew: An
Experiment in Evolutionary Analysis,” in Mark and Matthew II, ed. E.–M. Becker and A.
Runesson. Wissenschaftlice Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 304 (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2013), 37–73.
308 Richerson and Boyd, Not by Genes Alone, 211–16, 224–29.
309 Richerson and Boyd are not very clear on their own use of the term “symbolic marker”
but they seem to use it in a slightly broader sense than Czachesz. In this context, they also
refer to the research of Henry Tajfel, the founder of social identity theory. See Richerson
and Boyd, Not by Genes Alone, 221–22. Thus, my elaboration of the analysis of symbolic
markers with the concepts of the social identity approach does not contradict but
supplements Richerson and Boyd’s (and Czachesz’s) analytical perspective.
310 Exemplars refer to concrete examples of group members, either historical or present.
Prototypes and prototypicality are usually defined within the social identity approach as an
abstract, intuitively calculated picture of the ideal group members. In order to enhance the
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3.2. Towards a more comprehensive model
Although the creation and editing of gospels can be seen—to use David Sloan Wilson’s
characterization—as “adaptive responses to local pressures,” the future success of these
texts in cultural evolution depends on their more general ability to become widespread by
also appearing attractive and relevant to other groups.311
application of the social identity approach to historical material, I have suggested a
distinction between cultural prototypes and cognitive prototypes. Cultural prototypes are
culturally generated and transmitted pictures of ideal members while cognitive prototypes
are stored only in the minds of individual group members. For a more detailed discussion,
see Petri Luomanen “Cognitive Science in Biblical Studies: An Overview,” in Collegium
Biblicum Årsskrift 2011: Kognitionsforskning og eksegese, ed. K. Jeppsen and K. B.
Larsen (Copenhagen, Collegium Biblicum, selskab for danske eksegeter), 7–13.This
distinction slightly modifies my earlier suggestion in Petri Luomanen, “The Sociology of
Knowledge, the Social Identity Approach and the Cognitive Study of Religion,” in
Explaining Christian Origins and Early Judaism: Contributions from Cognitive and Social
Science, ed. P. Luomanen, Ilkka Pyysiäinen and Risto Uro. Biblical Interpretation Series
89 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007), 210–24.
311 Keeping in mind Stowers’ perceptive warnings not to picture authors as writing only for
the needs of their local communities (see above) it is to be noted that I am not claiming that
the features that support identity formation unmistakably reflect the concerns of the
authors’ local community. The point is that, whatever the reason why the features are in
the text, it is possible to assess their contribution to the formation and maintenance of
social identities among the recipients of the gospel narratives. This approach coheres with
the way in which Stowers sees Paul’s relation to his “communities”: rather than reflecting
an existing reality, Paul may have acted like an entrepreneur who envisioned and called
into being certain types of social formations, more or less successfully. Cf. Stowers, “The
Concept of ‘Community’ and the History of Early Christianity,” 242.
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The following model seeks to list some central characteristics that are required of a
text in order to become widespread in an emerging religious movement that is forming its
distinctive social identity. It is to be noted that the model does not try to explain the success
of religious texts in general. It is easy to find texts that do not meet the criteria of the
following model, but which, nevertheless, have been successfully spreading in religious
traditions. The focus of the model is on the texts that support the formation and
maintenance of new social identities, “mutations” in the development of religious
communities.
On the basis of the above considerations and drawing on the discussions on social
memory and cognitive approaches to ritual,312 I have divided the analytical perspectives to
be applied into four categories:
1) Formal characteristics of the discourse: attractiveness (which causes the story to
be retold) with closely related memorability, relevance (relevant mysteries),313 credence
and historical perspective.
2) Network discourse and community control: norms enhancing group solidarity,
ability to deal with the free rider problem, open/closed networks and weak/strong links.
3) Identity discourse: Social identity perspective (exemplars, cultural and cognitive
prototypes, stereotypes), identity building function of social memories and symbolic
identity markers.
312 Luomanen, “Cognitive Science in Biblical Studies”; Petri Luomanen, “How Religions
Remember: Memory Theories in Biblical Studies and the Cognitive Study of Religion,” in
Mind, Morality and Magic: Cognitive Science Approaches in Biblical Studies, ed. I.
Czachesz and Risto Uro (Durham: Acumen, 2013), 24–42.
313 Dan Sperber, Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996),
70–74. Because Sperber’s concept of relevant mystery is more formal in character than his
ideas about relevance in general, I am dealing with relevant mysteries in this formal
category. Overall relevance is more closely related to the social and historical setting on
the basis of which people find some representation more usable than others. Therefore, I
deal with this socially constructed relevance in connection with the identity discourse.
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4) Ritual discourse: number of rituals, their symbolic function, their identity-building
function, attractiveness (emotional arousal, immediacy of superhuman agents) and support
for transmission of religious traditions.
The three listed discourses, supplemented with the formal analysis of the discourse as
a whole, are partly overlapping. For instance, it is clear that identity is affected not only by
the topics that are listed under identity discourse but also through cultic activities,
community control and historical perspective of the narrative. Furthermore, the themes
listed under each discourse are only examples of the most central topics to be kept in mind.
4. Example: Comparing Mark, Matthew and Q
In another context I have conducted a more detailed comparison of Matthew’s and Mark’s
gospels and the sayings gospel Q in the framework of the above model.314 Space does not
allow the presentation of the detailed analysis here but the results can be summarized as
follows.
4.1. Why did Mark survive but Q did not?
As noted above, the comparison of Matthew, Mark and Q provides an interesting
opportunity to test the model developed above because it is possible to regard Q as a
document that was not selected as such in the cultural evolution of early Christianity. The
comparison of Q with the Gospel of Matthew is also highly relevant for the discussion of
the development of Christian morality because Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount—often
regarded as the crystallization of Jesus’ teachings and Christian morality—was in its
incipient form already in Q.
314 Luomanen, “From Mark and Q to Matthew.”
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Thus far, scholars have not been able to find satisfactory explanations for the fact
that even though Matthew and Luke prepared new and more complete editions of both Q
and Mark, only Mark has survived as a separate document. Often the result has been
considered largely as one of the coincidences of history. The results of the comparison in
the framework of the above model challenges this popular assumption by revealing clear
correspondences among several socio-cognitive factors contributing to the potential
survival of documents and the factual distribution of the Gospel of Mark, the Gospel of
Matthew and Q during the first centuries CE. Of these three documents, Matthew was most
popular, Mark almost fell into oblivion, and Q disappeared.
4.2. Applying the model
Judged on the basis of formal characteristics, Mark’s and Matthew’s narrative form,
which, nonetheless, includes short episodes, has a selective advantage over Q’s wisdom
discourse. Mark’s and Matthew’s episodes include more counterintuitive elements, which
enhances memorability. Episodes with their more vivid imagery also make better use of
memory resources by creating representations that are coded by several cognitive systems.
Q’s wisdom discourse is restricted more (but not solely) to semantic memory. Mark’s—
and even more so Matthew’s—narrative also sketches a clearer template for a historical
anchoring of social identity by linking Jesus’ history explicitly with Israel’s sacred past. Q
also presupposes Israel’s past and interprets the present in the light of the Deuteronomistic
scheme of God’s prophets calling people to repentance—and being rejected, but that is
more implicit than explicit. Although Matthew’s narrative is more complete than Mark’s,
which gives it some selective advantage, Mark also has its own unique character as a
narrative of relevant mysteries: the so-called Messianic secret, the disciples’
incomprehension, and the abrupt ending all entice memory searches and call for
explanations.
In terms of network discourse, Matthew’s narrative is the most open of the three: the
mission command at the end of the Gospel (Matt 28:16–20) reaches out programmatically
and the Sermon on the Mount sets out the principles of unconditional benevolence—in a
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form that has showed its attractive force throughout centuries. Matthew has accentuated
the benevolence that is already present in Q’s sermon. Q’s benevolence is not totally
without community control that counteracts free riding but Q’s control mechanisms are
modest in comparison with Matthew’s highly developed community rule that gives
detailed rules for the expulsion of community members (Matthew 18). Matthew also
emphasizes brotherly love more than Q, and that supports the formation of strong links
within the community. There are also signs of openness and control in Mark’s narrative but
they do not constitute such a central topic in Mark as they do in Matthew and Q. Mark’s
narrative focuses on unfolding the mystery of the suffering Messiah, not on transmitting
his teaching of unconditional benevolence or providing instructions on how to regulate life
in the post-resurrection congregation.
The narrative form of Mark and Matthew also show their selective advantage in the
identity discourse. The story about Jesus and his followers offers many more means of
identity construction than Jesus’ proclamation and teaching of ethical maxims in Q. The
characters in the narratives of Mark and Matthew function as cultural examples and
prototypes that serve identity formation. The narratives also make it possible to bind
identity with history. Matthew’s narrative includes many signs of more developed
stereotyping and typification of characters and their actions.315 The way in which Matthew
has reedited Mark’s narrative shows that there was a clear intention to make the story
about Jesus and his followers transparent to the situation of its later hearers/readers. This
kind of transparency is largely missing in Q. Confessing Jesus and the readiness to follow
him into suffering appear as symbolic identity markers in all three documents. In Q,
poverty and self-denial may also have functioned as identity markers. Matthew’s narrative,
for its part, clearly emphasizes baptism as an identity marker. Thus, although all three
include means of signaling identity, only Mark and Matthew provide a variety of means of
identity construction, and Matthew even more than Mark.
315 See Petri Luomanen, “Matthew's Corpus Mixtum in the Perspective of the Social
Identity Approach,” in Voces Calamantium in Deserto: Essays in Honor of Kari Syreeni,
ed., S.–O. Back and M. Kankaanniemi. Studier i exegetik och judaistik utgivna av
Teologiska fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi 11 (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 2012), 199–215.
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Ritual discourse is also more developed in Matthew than in Mark and Q. In addition
to institutionalizing baptism at the end of the Gospel, Matthew has also tuned up the ability
of rituals to signal identity to best serve openness towards outsiders and the consolidation
of identity within the in-group. This is achieved by emphasizing good works as the number
one outward signal of identity and restricting ritual behavior and its identity signaling
function to private and in-group settings (Matt 6:1–18). Furthermore, to the extent that
identity is signaled, it is not for self-enhancement but for the honor of the Heavenly Father
(Matt 5:13–16). Matthew also explicitly connects the transmission of Jesus’s teachings to
baptism which must have been an event that was coded deep in autobiographical memory,
enhancing memory retrieval of (at least some) of the teachings. On the other hand, the
words of the institution of the Eucharist—both in Mark and in Matthew—hark back to the
foundational history of the new movement. Although the Eucharist, if celebrated in the
context of ordinary meals, may not have caused much emotional arousal, the repetition of
the words in exactly the same form kept the memory of the beginnings alive. Although the
Q community may have had its own form of communal/Eucharistic meal, it significantly
weakened Q’s selective appeal that the text did not include any references to it.
All in all, this evolutionary analysis in terms of the above four discourses shows that
of these three documents, Q was the most likely to disappear as an independent document
and Matthew the most likely to be the most successful. It is important to note, however,
that Matthew’s successful evolutionary profile would not have been possible without Q. It
is the combination of Q’s unrestricted benevolence, the transparent potential of Mark’s
narrative, and the highly developed communal control and institutionalization from
Matthew’s special tradition that created the successful evolutionary profile of Matthew’s
narrative.
The essential difference between Mark and Q is that, although Mark does not include
quite as many elements as Matthew that support identity and transmission of tradition,
Mark nevertheless scores decently in all discourses. These results partly confirm Harvey
Whitehouse’s assumption according to which, in the long run, religions have to—if they
are to maintain their distinctive character—solve the problem of how to transmit
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cognitively costly traditions.316 Notably the content of this costly tradition in Q closely
approximates the counter-evolutionary message of Jesus, a “mutation” which, in
Theissen’s evolutionary interpretation, challenges the hard forces of natural selection.317
Obviously, Q as a document does not belong to the category of “religion is easy and
natural.”318 It rather sets high ethical standards and requires repentance. However, when
combined with the transparent story of Jesus that Mark originally sketched, Q’s teachings
received a more attractive frame that ensured the survival of its essential legacy for later
generations.
5. Conclusion
Thus far, the evolutionary analyses of the rise of Christianity have been either highly
abstract (Theissen, the methodological part of Wilson’s analysis) or relied heavily on
Rodney Stark’s account of the reasons why Christianity spread in the Roman Empire.
In the present chapter, I have introduced a model that aims at a more detailed account
of the mechanisms that affected the survival of early Christian gospels as foundational
documents of an emerging religious movement. The model is essentially based on the
assumptions that the spread of a religious movement requires or is supported by open
networks and unrestricted benevolence. However, the long-term survival requires a
repertoire of identity-building and supporting systems as well as norms that protect the
community from free riders. Consequently, the more a text provides these elements the
better chances of survival it has as the literature of an emerging religious movement.
The comparison of Q, Mark, and Matthew reveals many differences in the four
discourses examined (formal, network, identity, ritual), many of which seem to have
contributed to the better survival of Mark and Matthew. One of these differences deserves
316 Cf. Harvey Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of Religious
Transmission (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira, 2004), 49–59.
317 Cf. Theissen, Biblical Faith, 105–28.
318 Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity, 76.
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special notice because empirical research also seems to confirm its significance for moral
behavior: a text’s potential for identity building and maintenance. Kristen Renwick
Monroe’s contribution in this volume argues interestingly that identity is more important
than doctrine or norms as the source of altruistic behavior. Thus, if Rodney Stark is right
that Christian benevolence contributed significantly to the success of Christianity, the
central mechanism through which this behavior was enticed was perhaps not so much the
doctrine of love for one’s neighbor (which itself is not a novelty in Christianity) as the fact
that Christian communities had a variety of means to support new identities that showed
benevolence towards outsiders.
On the other hand, if the results of comparison—the development from Q to Mark
and Matthew—is viewed in the framework of Theissen’s theory, it seems that Jesus’
unconditional protest against selection, his uncompromising universalism and solidarity
with the weak, becomes partly compromised. Does this mean that, in order to survive, the
Christian gospel tradition had, after all, to adapt to similar harsh principles of selection as
those that govern biological evolution? Is that an inevitable direction of development in a
world that is framed by the principles of coevolution of nature and culture? Or is that
something that could and should be counteracted?
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